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Abstract: The development of the Internet of Things (IoT) plays a very important role for processing
data at the edge of a network. Therefore, it is very important to protect the privacy of IoT devices
when these devices process and transfer data. A mesh signature (MS) is a useful cryptographic
tool, which makes a signer sign any message anonymously. As a result, the signer can hide his
specific identity information to the mesh signature, namely his identifying information (such as
personal public key) may be hidden to a list of tuples that consist of public key and message.
Therefore, we propose an improved mesh signature scheme for IoT devices in this paper. The IoT
devices seen as the signers may sign their publishing data through our proposed mesh signature
scheme, and their specific identities can be hidden to a list of possible signers. Additionally, mesh
signature consists of some atomic signatures, where the atomic signatures can be reusable. Therefore,
for a large amount of data published by the IoT devices, the atomic signatures on the same data
can be reusable so as to decrease the number of signatures generated by the IoT devices in our
proposed scheme. Compared with the original mesh signature scheme, the proposed scheme has
less computational costs on generating final mesh signature and signature verification. Since atomic
signatures are reusable, the proposed scheme has more advantages on generating final mesh signature
by reconstructing atomic signatures. Furthermore, according to our experiment, when the proposed
scheme generates a mesh signature on 10 MB message, the memory consumption is only about
200 KB. Therefore, it is feasible that the proposed scheme is used to protect the identity privacy of
IoT devices.
Keywords: anonymity; mesh signature; IoT device; privacy; identity
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an important environment for processing data at the edge of
a network [1], where a huge amount of data is generated in IoT. Thus, we are always surrounded
by IoT data in our homes, cars and offices. IoT devices are responsible for acquiring, storing and
transferring data, as shown in Figure 1. By collecting, processing and analyzing the data through
IoT devices, consumers and organizations can gain valuable insights, the data can further help them
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make better decisions for the future. However, since data usually comes from multiple IoT devices on
different formats, after sensors acquire data from IoT devices, such as smart appliances, smart TVs,
and wearable health devices, data must be preprocessed. In IoT, data may be transmitted, saved and
retrieved at any time. For example, we build a system to collect location data of any things, such as
a things track system. In the system, location data enables you to track your packages, pallets and
devices in real time, rather than directing you to specific destinations. Therefore, as IoT devices
keep “connected” and communicate with each other by introducing various new ways, IoT enables
us to automatically complete certain tasks through some platforms, further making our life easier.
Currently many IoT devices are located on the edge of a network and lack of protection measures to
resist various attacks. Therefore, these devices are more vulnerable to some attacks, such as device
theft, device manipulation, identity theft, data eavesdropping and so on. Once an IoT system is
invaded, it may have a serious impact on the security of personal life or enterprise. For example,
attackers may track a person by attacking his/her mobile phone; further, when a physical defense
system based on IoT devices was successfully attacked in a building, it leads to that the attackers
can more easily access some confidential areas in the building. Obviously the current vulnerabilities
of IoT system can make attackers easier to implement these attacks. Therefore, when IoT devices
process their data, their privacy is easily disclosed. It is very important to protect the privacy of IoT
devices when these devices process and transfer data. Thus, the privacy of IoT devices needs to be
focused. The privacy protection of IoT devices refers to the privacy protection measures to prevent
the unnecessary disclosure of personal information. For the privacy protection technology of IoT
devices, many scholars have done a lot of research. The current privacy protection technology mainly
focuses on data publishing, data mining, wireless sensor network and other fields. In data publishing
field, it is mainly divided into data distortion-based technology, data encryption-based technology
and restricted publishing technology, among which the restricted publishing technology is mainly
realized by data anonymity. For example, when IoT devices sign and publish their data, and the
data anonymity technology may prevent disclosure of their identities. Additionally, IoT devices also
need to publish a large amount of data, thus it is also very important for IoT devices to decrease
the number of signatures generated by them in the same data. A mesh signature (MS) [2] allows a
user to hide his specific identity information in a list of tuples that consist of public key and message
when the user signs any message. Thus, mesh signature can only tell us that one of potential signers
signed the message. Furthermore, a mesh signature consists of some atomic signatures, where the
atomic signatures may be reused. Therefore, a mesh signature is a good choice for protecting the
identities of IoT devices when these devices issue their data. For example, in some IoT devices that
belong to one network group sign and publish their data through mesh signatures, no one can know
the specific identities of the publishing IoT devices, and further the old mesh signatures are easily
modified and reconstructed by partly generating some new atomic signatures so as to decrease the
number of signatures.
A mesh signature is the extension of a ring signature [3]. Compared with ring signature, mesh
signature can modularize the construction of signature, namely a user first must sign or collect enough
atomic signatures which are seen as the basic elements of mesh signature, then the user may construct
an access structure to mesh the atomic signatures and generate the final mesh signature. Boyen first
proposed the notion of mesh signature in the Cryptology-EUROCRYPT, 2007, and a revised version [4]
in the Journal of Cryptology, 2015. In the notion of mesh signatures, access structure is used to construct
different combinations of atomic signatures; and mesh signature does not disclose that which atomic
signature was used, thus atomic signatures can be reusable when a new mesh signature needs to
be generated. Compared with a ring signature, a mesh signature has the modularity, which may
provide much richer predicate expression of language. In [2,4], according to the context of mesh
signature, the mesh signature may use a tree as the access structure to represent the relationship
of atomic signatures. In the tree, its interior nodes denote the logic relationships, such as “And”,
“Or”, and “Threshold gates”, and its leaf nodes denote the specific atomic signatures. Thus, the
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construction of mesh signature is similar to another anonymous signature, attribute-based signature
(ABS) [5]. Compared with other kind of anonymous signatures (ring signature, attribute-based
signature and group signature [6]), the mesh signature consists of some atomic signatures, where the
atomic signatures can be reusable. Thus, the merit is very suitable for IoT devices. As IoT devices can
generate a large amount of data every day, if each IoT device both needs to sign and then publish its
data, then the signing cost is very heavy for itself, which needs to consume a lot of energy. However,
for many IoT devices, some publishing data are the same. Thus, if each IoT device may reuse some
“old” signatures by itself on the same data, then it will save the signing cost so as to decrease the
number of signatures generated by IoT devices. Therefore, for a large amount of data published by the
IoT devices, mesh signature is suitably used for publishing the same data.
Figure 1. Data collection framework in IoT.
We have the following example to show that how the structure of mesh signature is used to
protect the identities of IoT devices. For example, IoT device 1, IoT device 2 and IoT device 3 belong to
a online group at the edge of the network, where the public verification key of IoT device 1 is VKd1,
the public verification key of IoT device 2 is VKd2 and the public verification key of IoT device 3 is
VKd3. These devices both need to send their data to the IoT data collector, as shown in Figure 2. When
the IoT device 1 issues a tuple of messages {Msg1,Msg2,Msg3} to the IoT data collector, it does not
want to disclose that these messages are only published by itself. Therefore, this device may create
such mesh signature,
σ1 = [VKd1 : Msg1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
atomic signature−1
And [VKd2 : Msg2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
atomic signature−2
And [VKd3 : Msg3]︸ ︷︷ ︸
atomic signature−3
.
Then this device issues these messages by the names of three devices, thus its specific identity can
be hidden into these names. Additionally, another feature of mesh signature is that it is modularized
and its atomic signatures can be reusable, which is suitable for the same data published by the IoT
devices. For example, IoT device 1 may flexibly create a new mesh signature on other messages
{Msg4,Msg2,Msg5},
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σ2 = [VKd1 : Msg4]︸ ︷︷ ︸
atomic signature−4
And [VKd2 : Msg2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
atomic signature−2
And [VKd3 : Msg5]︸ ︷︷ ︸
atomic signature−5
,
where the atomic signature− 2 that binds to IoT device 2 is reused. As mesh signature has perfect
anonymity, it does not disclose any fact that how the two signatures σ1 and σ2 are made up as long as
the signatures σ1 and σ2 are valid.
However, although mesh signatures may be used in many security fields [3,7–20], few researchers
focused on the improvement of mesh signatures because of their complexity. Currently the generation
of mesh signatures consists of two main steps: (1) generating some atomic signatures; (2) generating a
final mesh signature based on previous atomic signatures. Because atomic signatures can be reused,
randomization technology is employed so that any adversary cannot know which atomic signatures
were reused. Compared with other similar anonymous signature schemes, the generation of mesh
signatures is relatively complicated in the existing schemes. In this paper, we focus on improving mesh
signatures, where we construct a novel mesh signature scheme for IoT devices.
Figure 2. A example of mesh signature in IoT.
1.2. Our Contributions
In this paper, we present an improved mesh signature for protecting the identities of IoT devices.
Also, we give a syntax of mesh signature in IoT. In this paper, our detailed contributions are as follows:
• We present a syntax for mesh signature in IoT. Compared with the works of [2,4], we further
clearly describe the frame of mesh signature in IoT. Under the proposed syntax, we present a
fully anonymous mesh signature scheme for IoT devices, where the IoT devices may be seen as
the signers to sign their data and their specific identities can be hidden. Additionally, the atomic
signatures on the same data can be reusable so as to decrease the number of signatures generated
by IoT devices.
• In our proposed scheme, we have limitedly defined the access structure of language expression by
monotone-span programs, thus the proposed mesh signature can resist the collusion attacks and
its access structure still support generalized monotone predicates. Also, under the security frame
proposed by [2,4], our proposed scheme is secure in the standard model, where the security of our
scheme can be reduced to the CDH assumption. Also, the proposed scheme has the anonymity
with enough security to protecting the identities of IoT devices.
• Compared with the original mesh signature scheme [2], the proposed scheme preserves the
original modularity. Although generating atomic signatures in the proposed scheme needs more
computational cost, the proposed scheme has less computational costs on generating final mesh
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signature and signature verification. Since atomic signatures are reusable, the proposed scheme
has more advantages on generating final mesh signature by reconstructing atomic signatures.
According to our experiment, it is feasible that the proposed scheme is used to protect the identity
privacy of IoT devices.
1.3. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related works about
the privacy protection of IoT devices. In Section 3, we review the complexity assumptions and the
related technologies on which we build. In Section 4, we show a syntax for MS in IoT. In Section 5,
we propose an improved mesh signature scheme for protecting the identities of IoT devices. In Section 6,
we analyze the efficiency and security of the proposed scheme. Finally, we draw our conclusions in
Section 7.
2. Related Work
Currently, many signature schemes have been used to protect the privacy (identities) of IoT
devices. Li [21] proposed an attribute-based signature to receive WiFi beacons and use Doppler Effect
and multipath signal to produce signatures. In their scheme, because these generated signatures do
not need sensor attachments, the related identities are still anonymous. Karati [1] proposed a secure
certificateless signature scheme to protect industrial-IoT Environments. The proposed signature scheme
is proved to be secure under bilinear strong Diffie–Hellman (BSDH) assumptions, which can resist
the Type-I and Type-II attacks. Furthermore, they analyzed the performance of their scheme, which is
superior to other similar schemes. Sun [22] proposed a decentralized multi-authority attribute-based
signature scheme for IoT devices. Compared with other similar signature schemes, their proposed
scheme has more perfect privacy and can resist authority corruption. Furthermore, their scheme
employs an extra cloud server to sign messages so as to decrease the signing cost. Xie [23] proposed a
novel group signature based on lattice for anonymous authentication in IoT. In their scheme, a user may
dynamically join a network group, and their proposed scheme easily revoke a group membership when
the user quits the group. Also, their scheme can effectively resist the frameability attack, where other
users cannot forge any user’s signature. Furthermore, their scheme is proved to be secure under lattice
problem. Mughal [24] proposed a lightweight shortened signature scheme to secure the communication
between devices in human centered IoT. In their scheme, the signing and verification procedures
need less costs. Also, for different document protection requirements, their scheme provides the
parameter selection function to make signature/verification. Their scheme is enough secure to resist
traffic analysis attacks. Additionally, compared with other similar signature schemes, their scheme
provides an experimental environment to test that whether their scheme can secure the communication
procedure between cell phones (or smart devices). The obtained results show their scheme is effective.
Cui [25] also proposed an attribute-based signature to protect industrial-IoT Environments under
constrained resources. Their scheme employs a server to decrease the signing and verification cost,
where a signing procedure can be immediately ceased when a signer is revoked. Li [26] proposed an
effective ring signcryption scheme to protect the data transmission procedure from sensors to servers
in IoT under public key infrastructure. They proved that their scheme is indistinguishable under
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks, whose
security can be reduced to the computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) assumption.
Additionally, many new anonymous signature schemes were also proposed, where the group
signature [27–31], ring signature [32–34] and attribute-based signature [35–37] all belong to anonymous
signatures. Libert et al. [28] proposed an effective group signature. Their proposed scheme has linear
size public keys, linear size revocation list and constant signature size. Furthermore, the verification time
is constant. We [31] proposed a traceable identity-based group signature, which employs verifier-local
revocation to revoke users. Under the proposed security frame, the security of our scheme can be
reduced to the CDH assumption. Yuen et al. [32] proposed a linkable ring signature, which is based on
Sensors 2020, 20, 758 6 of 23
the logic operations, such as “and”, “or” and “threshold”. In their scheme, a sub-linear size O(d ·
√
n)
signature can be generated, where d is a threshold and n is the number of potential signers in a ring.
Liu et al. [33] also proposed a perfect anonymous linkable ring signature scheme, where the generated
signature size is still linear with the number of possible signers in a ring. Au et al. [34] proposed a
novel identity-based linkable ring signature scheme, which is revocable-iff-linked. Kaafarani et al. [35]
proposed some traceable attribute-based signatures, which are decentralized. Their schemes provide
anonymity under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack. We [37] proposed an attribute-based signature,
which supports monotone predicates. Compared with other similar schemes, our scheme is efficient
by decreasing the signing and verification cost. Boyen first proposed the original mesh signature
in [2], which may be seen as the extension of ring signature. Compared with other kind of anonymous
signatures, the most advantage of mesh signature is that it can modularize the construction of signature
and provide much richer predicate expression of language. In 2015, Boyen proposed a revised version
in [4]. He considered that the construction of mesh signature is more flexible than that of ring signature,
thus they proposed the notion of mesh signature, in which the access structure is used to construct
different combinations of atomic signatures; and mesh signature does not disclose that which atomic
signature was used, thus atomic signatures can be reusable when a new mesh signature needs to be
generated. However, as the modularity of mesh signature is open to the construction of access structure
of language expression, original mesh signature [2,4] has a security weakness that this scheme cannot
satisfy the strict unforgeability because multiple illegal signers may collusively pool their obtained
atomic signatures together and then generate final mesh signature which none of them could produce.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Bilinear Maps
Let G1 and G2 be groups of prime order q and g be a generator of G1. We say G2 has an admissible





= e(g, g)a·b. The map is non-degenerate; we must have that e (g, g) 6= 1.
3.2. Computational Diffie–Hellman Assumption
Definition 1 (Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) Problem). Let G1 be a group of prime order q and g
be a generator of G1; for all (g, ga, gb) ∈ G1, with a, b ∈ Zq, the CDH problem is to compute ga·b.
Definition 2. The (h̄, ε)-CDH assumption holds if no h̄-time algorithm can solve the CDH problem with
probability at least ε.
3.3. Monotone-Span Programs
Let Υ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be a monotone boolean function. A monotone span program [5] for Υ
over a field F is an l × t matrix Λ with entries in F, along with a labeling function v : [l] → [n] that
associates each row of Λ with an input variable of Υ, that, for every (x1, x2......xn)∈ {0, 1}n, satisfies
the following:
Υ (x1, ......xn) = 1⇔ ∃
→
η ∈ F1×l :
→
η ·Λ = {1, 0, 0......0} and
(
∀i : xv(i) = 0⇒ ηi = 0
)
;
in other words, Υ(x1, x2......xn)= 1 if and only if the rows of Λ indexed by {i | xv(i) = 1} span the
vector [1, 0, 0......0], where we call l the length and t the width of the span program, and l + t the size of
the span program.
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4. A Syntax for MS in IoT
In this section, we present a syntax for mesh signature in IoT, where each IoT device is seen
as a signer, they need to issue their data to the IoT data collector. Intuitively, a mesh signature is
the combination of some atomic signatures, which satisfies the condition that the monotone boolean
expression Υ over access structure (or expression structure) is true. Therefore, in our proposed syntax
we set that the monotone boolean expression Υ is associated with a list of tuples that consist of public
key and message and its value is true if one IoT device possesses some corresponding atomic signatures
on the verified messages under the public verification keys, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Syntax for mesh signature in IoT.
In Figure 3, when one IoT device belonging to a network group needs to issue its data set to the
IoT data collector, the whole language expression Expression is represented by the form Expression ::=
{Lag1 OP Lag2......OP Lagl}, where Lagi is sub-expression belongs to the whole expression, OP
denotes the operation on the sub-expressions, l is the number of involved IoT devices belonging to the
same network group (or the number of atomic clauses in a mesh structure). The more detailed and
generalized form is as follows:
Expression ::= {Lag1 OP Lag2......OP Lagl}
= And{Lag1 , Lag2...... Lagm1}
| Or{Lag1 , Lag2...... Lagm2}
| Thresholdt,m3{Lag1 , Lag2...... Lagm3},
where we set l = m1 + m2 + m3. Then we consider the monotone boolean expression Υ over access
structure is true only if Υ(Lag1, Lag2......Lagl) = 1. Thus, for the previous-mentioned example, σ1 =
[VKd1 : Msg1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
atomic signature−1
And [VKd2 : Msg2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
atomic signature−2
And [VKd3 : Msg3]︸ ︷︷ ︸
atomic signature−3
, the form of the atomic signature [VKi :
Msgi] is set to Lagi, which means this “Msgi" is signed under VKi.
Definition 3. Improved Mesh signature in IoT: Let MS = (System-Setup, Generate-Key, Mesh-Sign,
Mesh-Verify) be a mesh signature scheme in IoT. In MS, all detailed algorithms are as follows:
(1) System-Setup: The authority system runs the randomized algorithm, and inputs a security parameter 1k.
In addition, the algorithm outputs all related public system parameters MRK and a master system private
key msk on the parameter 1k.
(2) Generate-Key: The authority system runs the randomized algorithm, and inputs (MRK, msk), and then
outputs the IoT device’s private/public key pair (ski, pki) to the device i, where i ∈ {1, 2......, n} (we set
that n is the number of the IoT devices).
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(3) Mesh-Sign: The randomized algorithm generates a mesh signature. The IoT device i issues its message set
(data) M ∈ {0, 1}∗ and then signs the message set, thus the device i runs the algorithm: (a) the algorithm
inputs (MRK, ski, PK_List, M), and then outputs a monotone boolean expression Υ and the atomic
signatures σi; (b) the algorithm inputs (MRK, ski, σi, Υ), and then outputs a mesh signature Φ, where
PK_List is a list of all the public keys of the devices involved with this signing; (c) the algorithm run by
the device i sends the message set M, the boolean expression Υ and the mesh signature Φ to the IoT data
collector.
(4) Mesh-Verify: The IoT data collector verifies the standard mesh signature Φ on Υ and M. The IoT data
collector runs the deterministic algorithm, and inputs (MRK, PK_List, M, Υ, Φ), and then outputs the
result, accept or reject.
5. Improved Mesh Signature Scheme for IoT Devices
In the section, we propose an improved mesh signature scheme for protecting the identities of
IoT devices. Currently the generation of mesh signatures consists of two main steps: (1) generating
some atomic signatures; (2) generating a final mesh signature based on previous atomic signatures.
Because atomic signatures can be reused, in our construction the randomization technology is also
employed so that any adversary cannot know which atomic signatures were reused. Compared with
the original mesh signature [2,4], we have limitedly defined the access structure of language expression
by monotone-span programs, thus improved mesh signature can still support generalized monotone
predicates over access structure. Let MS=(System-Setup, Generate-Key, Mesh-Sign, Mesh-Verify) be
a mesh signature scheme in IoT. In MS, all detailed algorithms are described as follows (shown in
Figure 4):
Figure 4. Improved mesh signatures for IoT devices.
(1) MS.System-Setup: The system runs this setup algorithm, and inputs the parameter 1k (used
as the security level). Also, we set that G1 and G2 are the groups of prime order q, g is a
generator of G1, and that e : G1 ×G1 → G2 denotes the bilinear map. In addition, we set that
H : {0, 1}∗ → Z1k ·q denotes one hash function and it can be used to output integers in Z1k ·q.
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Additionally, we assume that the monotone span programs related to claim-predicates have their
width at most tmax in our construction.
Then the following parameters are outputted in the system. The algorithm randomly chooses
a ∈ Zq and sets g1 = ga. Five group elements y, f , ϑ, ψ and v ∈ G1 are randomly picked. Also,
the algorithm generates a tmax-length vector Ψ = (ui), whose element ui is randomly picked
from G1. Finally the algorithm outputs the public parameters MPK=(G1, G2, e, g, g1, y, f , ϑ, ψ,
v, Ψ), where msk = a is a master private key in the system.
(2) MS.Generate-Key: The system runs the algorithm and then generates IoT device’s
private/public key pair. For the device i, the algorithm inputs (MRK, msk), and then it randomly
picks ai,0, ai,1 ∈ Zq, sets ski,0 = ai,0 and computes ski,1 = f msk · yai,1 = f a · yai,1 , pki,0 = gai,0 and
pki,1 = gai,1 , where we set ski=(ski,0, ski,1) as the private key of the device i and pki=(pki,0, pki,1)
as the public key of the device i.
(3) MS.Mesh-Sign: The IoT device i signs a message set M ∈ {0, 1}∗, where the message set
M ={msg1, msg2, ....., msgl}. The device i runs the algorithm, and then inputs (MRK, ski, PK_List,
M) where PK_List is a list of the public keys of the IoT devices involved with this signing, and
then the following steps are finished:
• atomic signature
The algorithm randomly chooses zi ∈ Zq and a vector (ri,k) with ri,k ∈ Zq and k ∈ [1, 2......l],
and then computes the atomic signatures as follows:
– Compute xi,0,k = g
ski,0
l ·vri,k , xi,1,k = gri,k , with k ∈ [1, 2, ......, l];
– For the messages msg1, msg2, ....., msgl , the algorithm computes vk = H(msgk||pkk)
with k ∈ [1, 2......, l], where we assume the signing needs to involve l IoT devices, pkk is
the public key of the k-th device with pkk ∈ PK_List;
– For V = (v1, v2, ....., vl), generate the claim-predicate Υ which satisfies Υ(V) = 1, and





– Compute sk,j = ψri,k · (uj)vk ·ri,k with k ∈ [1, 2......, l] and j ∈ [1, 2......, tmax];




, where k ∈
[1, 2......, l] and j ∈ [1, 2......, tmax].
Remark: As one of the atomic signatures, we can denote
σi,k =
{
xi,0,k, xi,1,k, (sk,1, sk,2, ......, sk,tmax )
}
,
with k ∈ [1, 2......, l].
• mesh signature
The algorithm randomly chooses b, c, t, d0, d1, ....., dl ∈ Zq, and then computes the mesh
signature as follows:
– Compute X0 = ∏lk=1(xi,0,k) · ϑ(d0+b)·H(M) · ψd0+b · vd0 , X1 = gd0+b, X2 = gd0 ·
∏lk=1(xi,1,k) = g
d0+∑lk=1 ri,k , X3 = pki,1 · gc, X4 = yai,0 · yc, X5,k = xi,1,k · gd0+t = gri,k+d0+t
with k ∈ [1, 2......, l];
– Compute the vector −→η = (ηk) related to the satisfying assignment V = (v1, v2, ....., vl),
where ηk ∈ Zq with k ∈ [1, 2......, l];
– Compute Ik = gdk · (X1)
ηk
vk with k ∈ [1, 2......, l], Qj = ski,1 · yc · gc ·X0 ·∏lk=1 ψ
(d0+t)·Λk,j ·
∏lk=1[(sk,j)
Λk,j · (uj)(d0+t)·Λk,j ·vk · (uj)dk ·Λk,j ·vk ] with j ∈ [1, 2......, tmax];
– The algorithm finally generates and outputs a mesh signature
Φ = {X1, X2, X3, X4, (X5,1, ......., X5,l) , (I1, ......., Il) , (Q1, ......., Qtmax )}.
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Then the algorithm sends the message set M, the boolean expression Υ and the mesh
signature Φ to the IoT data collector.
(4) MS.Mesh-Verify: The IoT data collector verifies the mesh signature Φ on the monotone
boolean expression Υ and the message set M. The algorithm run by the IoT data collector inputs
(MRK, PK_List, M, Υ, Φ), and then the following steps are finished (the complete computation
is shown in Appendix A.3):
• For the message set M ={msg1, msg2, .....msgl}, the algorithm computes vk = H(msgk||pkk)
with k ∈ [1, 2......, l], where pkk is the public key of the k-th device with pkk ∈ PK_List.
• For V = (v1, v2, ....., vl), the algorithm transforms the claim-predicate Υ to the monotone
span program Λ ∈
(
Zq
)l×tmax , where Υ(V) = 1.
• The algorithm computes
e ( f , g1) · e (y, X3) · e (g, X4) · e
(
ϑH(M) · ψ, X1
)
· e (v, X2) · ∏lk=1 e(ψ
Λk,j · ujvk ·Λk,j , X5,k) ·
∏lk=1 e(uj
















, j > 1
If the equation is correct, the algorithm outputs accept, otherwise it outputs reject.
6. Analysis of Our Scheme
6.1. Security Analysis
In our proposed mesh signature scheme, we need to consider the two notions “one-more
unforgeability” and “full anonymity”. First, any IoT device cannot forge a new mesh signature
on any corrupted or fresh information. Second, the anonymity of IoT device will be preserved even
if some atomic signatures are reused to generate a new mesh signature, namely mesh signature and
its atomic signatures must be anonymous, where we need to use the technology of randomization
to randomize the generated signatures. Under the security frame proposed by [2,4], our scheme is
proven to be unforgeable and anonymous.
Theorem 1. Our proposed scheme is (h̄, ε, qk, qa, qm)-unforgeable, where we assume that the (h̄
′, ε′)-CDH
assumption can hold in G1, and:
ε′ = (1− qkq ) · [1− qa + qa · (1−
1
q )
l ] · (1− qmq ) · ε,
h̄′ = h̄ + O(qk · [3 · Cexp + Cmul ] + qa · [(2 · l · tmax + 3) · Cexp + (l · tmax + 1) · Cmul ] + qm · [(4 · l · tmax +
3 · l + 13) · Cexp + (4 · l · tmax + 4 · l + 8) · Cmul ]),
qk denotes the queries number of “Generate-Key” oracle, qa denotes the queries number of “Atomic Signature”
oracle, qm denotes the queries number of “Mesh Signature” oracle, Cmul denotes the time of a multiplication in
G1, Cexp denotes the time of an exponentiation in G1. (This proof is provided to Appendix A.1)
Theorem 2. Our proposed scheme is (h̄, ε, qk, qa, qm)-anonymous, where we assume that the (h̄
′, ε′)-CDH
assumption can hold in G1, and:
ε′ = (1− qk1q ) · (1−
qk2
q ) · [1− qa1 + qa1 · (1−
1
q )
l ] · [1− qa2 + qa2 · (1− 1q )l ] · (1−
qm1
q ) · (1−
qm2
q ) · (ε−
1
2 ),
h̄′ = h̄ + O((qk1 + qk2) · [3 · Cexp + Cmul ] + (qa1 + qa2) · [(2 · l · tmax + 3) · Cexp + (l · tmax + 1) · Cmul ] +
(qm1 + qm2) · [(4 · l · tmax + 3 · l + 13) · Cexp + (4 · l · tmax + 4 · l + 8) · Cmul ]),
qk1 and qk2 denote the queries numbers of “Generate-Key” oracle in the query phases 1 and 2 respectively, qa1
and qa2 denote the queries numbers of “Atomic Signature” oracle in the query phases 1 and 2 respectively, qm1
and qm2 denote the queries numbers of “Mesh Signature” oracle in the query phases 1 and 2 respectively, Cmul
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denotes the time of a multiplication in G1, Cexp denotes the time of an exponentiation in G1. (This proof is
provided to Appendix A.2)
6.2. Efficiency Analysis
In the proposed scheme, the length of the atomic signatures is (2 · l + l · tmax) · |G1|, the length
of the mesh signature is (4 + 2 · l + tmax) · |G1|, where |G1| is the size of element in G1. Because xi,0,k,
xi,1,k, ψri,k in sk,j may be pre-computed (To make our analysis simple, we set the time of integer and
hash computations is ignored.), signing a message set for the atomic signatures only computes at most
l · tmax exponentiations in G1 and l · tmax multiplications in G1. Also, because X1, X2, X3, X4, X5,k, gdk
in Ik, ∏lk=1(xi,0,k) · ψd0+b ·vd0 in X0, ski,1 · yc · gc in Qj may be pre-computed, signing a message set for
the mesh signature only computes at most 4 · l · tmax + l + 1 exponentiations in G1 and 4 · l · tmax + l + 1
multiplications in G1. In the verify algorithm, because the value e( f , g1) can be pre-computed and
cached, the verification needs (2 · l + 1) · tmax + 5 pairing computations, 2 · l · tmax exponentiations
in G1, 2 · l · tmax + 5 multiplications in G1. Furthermore, we compare our proposed scheme with the
original mesh signature scheme [2] in detail. Table 1 shows the performance comparison according
to our theoretical analysis (In this comparison, we assume that the order of assigned structure tree
in [2] is set to tmax.), where Cmul denotes the time of a multiplication in G1, Cexp denotes the time of
an exponentiation in G1 and Cpair denotes the time of a pairing computation. According to Table 1,
we can know although generating atomic signatures in our scheme needs more computational cost,
our scheme has less computational costs on generating final mesh signature and signature verification.
Since atomic signatures are reusable, our scheme has more advantages on generating final mesh
signature by reconstructing atomic signatures.
Table 1. Complexity of Two Schemes.
Atomic Signatures Mesh Signature Verification
Original scheme [2]
(6 · (l + 1) · tmax) · Cexp+ ((l + 1) · tmax + 1) · Cpair+
Cexp (4 · l · tmax + tmax) · Cmul 3 · (l + 1) · tmax · Cexp+
3 · l · tmax · Cmul
Our scheme
(4 · l · tmax + l + 1)· ((2 · l + 1) · tmax + 5) · Cpair+
l · tmax · (Cexp + Cmul) (Cexp + Cmul) 2 · l · tmax · Cexp+
(2 · l · tmax + 5) · Cmul
Additionally, we make some experiments to test and evaluate the actual performance of our
scheme. In the tests, we employ the paring based cryptography (PBC) library to simulate our scheme,
where the experimental computer is under Intel Core i5 2.7 GHz and RAM 8GB. In our experiments,
we use the Type A parings in PBC library to construct the parings, where the lengths of the parameters
p and q are respectively set as 160 bits and 512 bits. Furthermore, the parameter l is set to {1, 10, 20,
30, 40, 50}, and then we test our scheme and the original scheme [2] 10 times on average under the
different settings of l. Table 2 shows the actual performance comparison of our scheme and the original
scheme. Similar to our theoretical analysis, our scheme has less computational costs on generating
final mesh signature and signature verification, compared with the original scheme.
Sensors 2020, 20, 758 12 of 23
Table 2. Actual Performance of Two Schemes.
Computational Costs (ms)
l 1 10 20 30 40 50
Original scheme [2]
Atomic Signatures 1.958 1.746 1.590 1.605 1.566 1.629
Mesh Signature 91.495 583.225 1038.55 1617.78 2003.15 2270.82
Verification 61.457 339.048 593.315 1001.73 1263.15 1473.34
Our scheme
Atomic Signatures 7.890 78.850 164.900 236.100 313.600 387.250
Mesh Signature 37.752 353.003 881.153 981.836 1551.64 1675.29
Verification 37.910 441.830 591.710 1000.43 1150.84 1128.29
Since our scheme is used to protect the identity privacy of IoT devices, we further test our memory
consumption through signing different sizes of messages. Figure 5 shows the change of memory
consumption by signing different sizes of messages, where the sizes of messages are set to 100 KB,
1 MB, 10 MB, 20 MB, 50 MB respectively. In Figure 5, when our scheme generates a mesh signature
on 10 MB message, the memory consumption is only about 200 KB. Therefore, it is feasible that our
scheme is used to protect the identity privacy of IoT devices.
Figure 5. Memory consumption under different sizes of messages.
7. Conclusions
IoT devices are responsible for acquiring, storing, and transferring data. Currently, many IoT
devices are located on the edge of a network and lack of protection measures to resist various
attacks [38–43]. Therefore, these devices are more vulnerable to some attacks, such as device theft,
device manipulation, identity theft, data eavesdropping and so on. Thus, the privacy of IoT devices
needs to be focused. It is very important to protect the identities of IoT devices when these devices
process and transfer data [44–52]. Then we present a syntax about mesh signature in IoT. Under the
proposed syntax, we present a fully anonymous mesh signature scheme for IoT devices, where the
IoT devices may be seen as the signers to sign their data and their specific identities can be hidden.
In our proposed scheme, the generation of mesh signatures consists of two main steps: (1) generating
some atomic signatures; (2) generating a final mesh signature based on previous atomic signatures.
Additionally, as IoT devices can generate a large amount of data every day, if each IoT device both
needs to sign and then publish its data, then the signing cost is very heavy for itself. Thus, if each
IoT device reuses some “old” signatures by itself on the same data, it will save the signing cost so as
to decrease the number of signatures generated by IoT devices. In our proposed scheme, the atomic
signatures on the same data can be reusable so as to decrease the number of signatures. Although the
atomic signatures can be reused, the randomization technology is employed so that any adversary
cannot know which atomic signatures were reused. Thus, the merit is very suitable for IoT devices.
Furthermore, in our proposed scheme we have limitedly defined the access structure of language
expression by monotone-span programs, thus the proposed mesh signature can resist the collusion
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attacks and its access structure still support generalized monotone predicates. Compared with the
original mesh signature scheme, our proposed scheme has its advantage, which has linear size length
of signature.
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Appendix A.
Appendix A.1. Unforgeability
Proof of Theorem 1. We set that MS is our proposed mesh signature scheme. Also we set that A is
an adversary with the tuple (h̄, ε, qk, qa, qm) that can make attack to MS. To make interaction with the
adversary A, an algorithm B is constructed. For (g, ga, gb)∈ G1, B may make interaction with A to
compute ga·b. Then the algorithm B can be assumed to solve the CDH problem with probability at
least ε′ and in time at most h̄′, which is contrary to the (h̄′, ε′)-CDH assumption. Therefore, we may
build a simulation procedure as follows:
Setup: The parameter 1k is inputted. Also, we set that G1 and G2 are the groups of prime order
q, g is a generator of G1, and that e : G1 ×G1 → G2 denotes the bilinear map. In addition, we set
that H : {0, 1}∗ → Z1k ·q denotes one hash function and it can be used to output integers in Z1k ·q.
Additionally, we assume that the monotone span programs related to claim-predicates have their
width at most tmax in our construction.
Then the following parameters are outputted. The algorithm sets g1 = ga and f = gb with
a, b ∈ Zq (B does not know a and b), chooses ω, β, ι, ϕ, $ ∈ Zq, and then sets y = f ω = gβ, ϑ = gι,
ψ = gϕ and v = g$. In addition, the algorithm chooses `j ∈ Zq for all js with j ∈ [1, 2......tmax], and then
sets uj = g
`j for all js with j ∈ [1, 2......tmax]. Then this system outputs all the parameters MRK=(G1,
G2, e, g, g1, y, f , ϑ, ψ, v, Ψ = (uj)), where msk = a is seen as the master key of the system.
Queries: Amakes the following key and signature queries, then B gives its answers as follows:
• Generate-Key(): Given the public parameters MRK, for the device i, the algorithm randomly
chooses ai,0, ai,1 ∈ Zq, sets ski,0 = ai,0 and computes ski,1 = yai,1 , pki,0 = gai,0 and pki,1 = gai,1 · g
− 1ω
1 ,
where ski=(ski,0, ski,1) is the private key of the device i and pki=(pki,0, pki,1) is the public key of the
device i, and then the private/public key pair is passed to the adversary A.
Remark: To the correctness of ski and pki, they may be changed as follows:
ski,1 = yai,1 = f a · f−a · yai,1 = f a · f ω·
−a
ω · yai,1 = f a · y− aω · yai,1 = f a · yai,1− aω ,
pki,1 = gai,1 · g
− 1ω
1 = g
ai,1 · g− aω = gai,1− aω .
Setting a′i,1 = ai,1 −
a
ω , then ski,1 = f
a · ya
′
i,1 and pki,1 = g
a′i,1 . Therefore, ski and pki is a valid
private/public key pair.
If ai,1− aω = 0 mod q, the above procedure cannot occur and aborts. Otherwise, a private/public
key pair is outputted to A.
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• Atomic-Sign(): Given the public parameters MRK, the public key list PK_List and the message
M, where PK_List is a list of the public keys of the devices involved with this query (with respect
to the device i), the algorithm finishes the following steps:
– The algorithm randomly chooses ski,0, zi ∈ Zq and a vector (ri,k) with ri,k ∈ Zq and k ∈
[1, 2......l], computes xi,0,k = g
ski,0
l · vri,k and xi,1,k = gri,k with k ∈ [1, 2......l], and then saves
ski,0 where ski,0 = ai,0;
– The message M is divided to msg1, msg2, ......msgl ; then the algorithm computes vk =
H(msgk||pkk) with k ∈ [1, 2......l], where we assume the signing needs to involve l devices,
pkk is the public key of the k-th device with pkk ∈ PK_List;
– For V = (v1, v2, .....vl), generate the claim-predicate Υ which satisfies Υ(V) = 1, and then




– Compute sk,j = ψri,k · (uj)vk ·ri,k with k ∈ [1, 2......l] and j ∈ [1, 2......tmax];




to A, where k ∈
[1, 2......l] and j ∈ [1, 2......tmax].
If vk = H(msgk||pkk) = 0 mod q with k ∈ [1, 2......l], then the above procedure cannot ocur and
aborts. Otherwise, the atomic signatures are passed to the adversary A.
• Mesh-Sign(): Given the public parameters MRK, the atomic signatures σa ={
(xi,0,k), (xi,1,k), (sk,j)
}
on the public key list PK_List and the message M (with respect to
the device i), and the monotone boolean expression Υ, the algorithm finishes the following steps:
– Choose b, c, t, d0, d1, .....dl , ai,1 ∈ Zq randomly, compute X0 = ∏lk=1(xi,0,k) · ϑ(d0+b)·H(M) ·
ψd0+b · vd0 , X1 = gd0+b, X2 = gd0 ·∏lk=1(xi,1,k) = gd0+∑
l
k=1 ri,k , X3 = gai,1 · g
− 1ω
1 · gc, X4 =
yski,0 · yc according to the corresponding ski,0, X5,k = xi,1,k · gd0+t = gri,k+d0+t with k ∈
[1, 2......l];
– Compute the vector −→η = (ηk) related to the satisfying assignment V = (v1, v2, .....vl), where
ηk ∈ Zq with k ∈ [1, 2......l];
– Compute Ik = gdk · (X1)
ηk
vk with k ∈ [1, 2......l], Qj = yai,1 · yc · gc · X0 ·∏lk=1 ψ
(d0+t)·Λk,j ·
∏lk=1[(sk,j)
Λk,j · (uj)(d0+t)·Λk,j ·vk · (uj)dk ·Λk,j ·vk ] with j ∈ [1, 2..... .tmax];
– The algorithm finally generates and outputs a mesh signature
σm = {X1, X2, X3, X4, (X5,1, .......X5,l) , (I1, .......Il) , (Q1, .......Qtmax )}.
Similarly, setting a′i,1 = ai,1 −
a
ω , σm is a valid mesh signature. If ai,1 −
a
ω = 0 mod q, the above
procedure cannot occur and aborts. Otherwise, a mesh signature σm is outputted to A.
Forgery: If B finally does not abort, then A can return its forgery with probability at least ε, (MRK,




)l×tmax , the vector−→η ∗ = (η∗k ) is related to the satisfying assignment V∗ = (v∗1 , v∗2 , .....v∗l ) with
k ∈ [1, 2......l]. It succeeds if
(a) accept←Mesh-Verify(MRK, PK_List∗, M∗, Υ∗, Φ∗);
(b) A did not query Generate-Key on any public key belongs to PK_List∗, and it did not query
Mesh-Sign on the related inputs PK_List∗, M∗ and Υ∗.
Then we may get the following:













where Υ∗(V∗) = 1, and















































































= f a = ga·b,
which solves the given CDH problem.
Then, we compute the probability that B does not abort. For the complete simulation procedure
of B, we must assure that all key queries can have ai,1 − aω 6= 0 mod q, all atomic signature queries
can have vk = H(msgk||pkk) 6= 0 mod q for all k ∈ [1, 2......l], and all mesh signature queries can
have ai,1 − aω 6= 0 mod q. Therefore, if B will not abort, then we must assure that the following three
conditions hold:
(a) ai,1 − aω 6= 0 mod q in related key queries;
(b) vk = H(msgk||pkk) 6= 0 mod q for all k ∈ [1, 2......l] in related atomic signature queries;
(c) ai,1 − aω 6= 0 mod q in related mesh signature queries.
To make our analysis easier to understand, we define the events Ej, Rj and Tj as
Ej :ai,1 − aω 6= 0 mod q, with j=1, 2......qk, qk denotes the queries number of “Generate-Key” oracle;
Rj :vk = H(msgk||pkk) 6= 0 mod q for all k ∈ [1, 2......l], with j=1, 2......qa, qa denotes the queries
number of “Atomic Signature” oracle;
Tj :ai,1 − aω 6= 0 mod q, with j=1, 2......qm, qm denotes the queries number of “Mesh Signature” oracle.
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= (1− qkq ) · [1− qa + qa · (1−
1
q )
l ] · (1− qmq ).
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Therefore, we can get that ε′ = (1− qkq ) · [1− qa + qa · (1−
1
q )
l ] · (1− qmq ) · ε.
If B is completely simulated, then A generates a valid mesh signature forgery with probability
at least ε, and B may be used to compute ga·b. The time cost of B mainly includes the time of
the exponentiations and multiplications in queries. We assume that the time of other lightweight
computations is ignored (such as integer addition, integer multiplication and hash computation), then
the time cost of B is
h̄′ = h̄ + O(qk · [3 · Cexp + Cmul ] + qa · [(2 · l · tmax + 3) · Cexp + (l · tmax + 1) · Cmul ] + qm · [(4 · l · tmax +
3 · l + 13) · Cexp + (4 · l · tmax + 4 · l + 8) · Cmul ]).
Thus, Theorem 1 follows.
Appendix A.2. Anonymity
Proof of Theorem 2. (This proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, the difference between them is to add
the queries of phase 2.)
We set that MS is our proposed mesh signature scheme. Also we set that A is an adversary
with the tuple (h̄, ε, qk, qa, qm) that can make attack to MS. To make interaction with the adversary A,
an algorithm B is constructed. For (g, ga, gb)∈ G1, B may make interaction with A to compute ga·b.
Then the algorithm B can be assumed to solve the CDH problem with probability at least ε′ and in time
at most h̄′, which is contrary to the (h̄′, ε′)-CDH assumption. Therefore, we may build a simulation
procedure as follows:
1. Setup: The parameter 1k is inputted. Also, we set that G1 and G2 are the groups of prime order
q, g is a generator of G1, and that e : G1 ×G1 → G2 denotes the bilinear map. In addition, we set
that H : {0, 1}∗ → Z1k ·q denotes one hash function and it can be used to output integers in Z1k ·q.
Additionally, we assume that the monotone span programs related to claim-predicates have their
width at most tmax in our construction.
Then the following parameters are outputted. The algorithm sets g1 = ga and f = gb with
a, b ∈ Zq (B does not know a and b), chooses ω, β, ι, ϕ, $ ∈ Zq, and then sets y = f ω = gβ, ϑ = gι,
ψ = gϕ and v = g$. In addition, the algorithm chooses `j ∈ Zq for all js with j ∈ [1, 2......tmax], and
then sets uj = g
`j for all js with j ∈ [1, 2......tmax]. Then this algorithm outputs all the parameters
MRK=(G1, G2, e, g, g1, y, f , ϑ, ψ, v, Ψ = (uj)), where msk = a is seen as the master key of the system.
2. Queries Phase 1: A makes the following key and signature queries, then B gives its answers
as follows:
• Generate-Key(): Given the public parameters MRK, for the device i, the algorithm randomly
chooses ai,0, ai,1 ∈ Zq, sets ski,0 = ai,0 and computes ski,1 = yai,1 , pki,0 = gai,0 and pki,1 = gai,1 · g
− 1ω
1 ,
where ski=(ski,0, ski,1) is the private key of the device i and pki=(pki,0, pki,1) is the public key of
the device i, and then the private/public key pair is passed to the adversary A. Similarly, setting
a′i,1 = ai,1−
a
ω , then ski,1 = f
a · ya
′
i,1 and pki,1 = g
a′i,1 . Therefore, ski and pki is a valid private/public
key pair.
If ai,1− aω = 0 mod q, the above procedure cannot occur and aborts. Otherwise, a private/public
key pair is outputted to A.
• Atomic-Sign(): Given the public parameters MRK, the public key list PK_List and the message
M, where PK_List is a list of the public keys of the devices involved with this query (with respect
to the device i), the algorithm finishes the following steps:
– The algorithm randomly chooses ski,0, zi ∈ Zq and a vector (ri,k) with ri,k ∈ Zq and k ∈
[1, 2......l], computes xi,0,k = g
ski,0
l · vri,k and xi,1,k = gri,k with k ∈ [1, 2......l], and then saves
ski,0 where ski,0 = ai,0;
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– The message M is divided to msg1, msg2, .....msgl ; then the algorithm computes vk =
H(msgk||pkk) with k ∈ [1, 2......l], where we assume the signing needs to involve l devices,
pkk is the public key of the k-th device with pkk ∈ PK_List;
– For V = (v1, v2, .....vl), generate the claim-predicate Υ which satisfies Υ(V) = 1, and then




– Compute sk,j = ψri,k · (uj)vk ·ri,k with k ∈ [1, 2......l] and j ∈ [1, 2......tmax];




to A, where k ∈
[1, 2......l] and j ∈ [1, 2......tmax].
If vk = H(msgk||pkk) = 0 mod q with k ∈ [1, 2......l], then the above procedure cannot occur and
will abort; otherwise the atomic signatures are passed to the adversary A.
• Mesh-Sign(): Given the public parameters MRK, the atomic signatures σa ={
(xi,0,k), (xi,1,k), (sk,j)
}
on the public key list PK_List and the message M (with respect to
the device i), and the monotone boolean expression Υ, the algorithm finishes the following steps:
– Choose b, c, t, d0, d1, .....dl , ai,1 ∈ Zq randomly, compute X0 = ∏lk=1(xi,0,k) · ϑ(d0+b)·H(M) ·
ψd0+b · vd0 , X1 = gd0+b, X2 = gd0 ·∏lk=1(xi,1,k) = gd0+∑
l
k=1 ri,k , X3 = gai,1 · g
− 1ω
1 · gc, X4 =
yski,0 · yc according to the corresponding ski,0, X5,k = xi,1,k · gd0+t = gri,k+d0+t with k ∈
[1, 2......l];
– Compute the vector −→η = (ηk) related to the satisfying assignment V = (v1, v2, .....vl), where
ηk ∈ Zq with k ∈ [1, 2......l];
– Compute Ik = gdk · (X1)
ηk
vk with k ∈ [1, 2......l], Qj = yai,1 · yc · gc · X0 ·∏lk=1 ψ
(d0+t)·Λk,j ·
∏lk=1[(sk,j)
Λk,j · (uj)(d0+t)·Λk,j ·vk · (uj)dk ·Λk,j ·vk ] with j ∈ [1, 2..... .tmax];
– The algorithm finally generates and outputs a mesh signature
σm = {X1, X2, X3, X4, (X5,1, .......X5,l) , (I1, .......Il) , (Q1, .......Qtmax )}.
Similarly, setting a′i,1 = ai,1 −
a
ω , σm is a valid mesh signature. If ai,1 −
a
ω = 0 mod q, the above
procedure cannot occur and aborts. Otherwise, a mesh signature σm is passed to A.
3. Challenge: The adversary A sends its forgeries (MRK, PK_List∗ ∪ {pk∗0} ∪ {pk∗1}, M∗, Υ∗, Φ∗) to
the challenger. The following conditions are satisfies:
(a) The adversary did not make query to Generate-Key on pk∗0 (and pk
∗
1);
(b) The adversary did not make query to Atomic-Sign on pk∗0 (and pk
∗
1);
(c) The adversary did not make query to Mesh-Sign on pk∗0 (and pk
∗
1).
The challenger randomly chooses a bit x ∈ {0, 1}, and then the following is outputted as
σ∗ ←Mesh-Sign(MRK, sk∗x, PK_List∗ ∪ {pk∗0} ∪ {pk∗1}, M) to A.
4. Queries Phase 2: A makes the following key and signature queries, then B gives its answers
as follows:
• Generate-Key(): Given the public parameters MRK, for the device i, the algorithm randomly
chooses ai,0, ai,1 ∈ Zq, sets ski,0 = ai,0 and computes ski,1 = yai,1 , pki,0 = gai,0 and pki,1 = gai,1 · g
− 1ω
1 ,
where ski=(ski,0, ski,1) is the private key of the device i and pki=(pki,0, pki,1) is the public key of
the device i, and then the private/public key pair is passed to the adversary A. Similarly, setting
a′i,1 = ai,1−
a
ω , then ski,1 = f
a · ya
′
i,1 and pki,1 = g
a′i,1 . Therefore, ski and pki is a valid private/public
key pair.
If ai,1− aω = 0 mod q, the above procedure cannot occur and aborts. Otherwise, a private/public
key pair is outputted to A.
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• Atomic-Sign(): Given the public parameters MRK, the public key list PK_List and the message
M, where PK_List is a list of the public keys of the devices involved with this query (with respect
to the device i), the algorithm finishes the following steps:
– The algorithm randomly chooses ski,0, zi ∈ Zq and a vector (ri,k) with ri,k ∈ Zq and k ∈
[1, 2......, l], computes xi,0,k = g
ski,0
l ·vri,k and xi,1,k = gri,k with k ∈ [1, 2......, l], and then saves
ski,0 where ski,0 = ai,0;
– The message M is divided to msg1, msg2, ....., msgl ; then the algorithm computes vk =
H(msgk||pkk) with k ∈ [1, 2......, l], where we assume the signing needs to involve l devices,
pkk is the public key of the k-th device with pkk ∈ PK_List;
– For V = (v1, v2, ....., vl), generate the claim-predicate Υ which satisfies Υ(V) = 1, and then




– Compute sk,j = ψri,k · (uj)vk ·ri,k with k ∈ [1, 2......, l] and j ∈ [1, 2......, tmax];




to A, where k ∈
[1, 2......, l] and j ∈ [1, 2......, tmax].
If vk = H(msgk||pkk) = 0 mod q with k ∈ [1, 2......, l], the above procedure cannot be occur and
will abort; otherwise the atomic signatures are passed to the adversary A.
• Mesh-Sign(): Given the public parameters MRK, the atomic signatures σa ={
(xi,0,k), (xi,1,k), (sk,j)
}
on the public key list PK_List and the message M (with respect to
the device i), and the monotone boolean expression Υ, the algorithm finishes the following steps:
– Choose b, c, t, d0, d1, ....., dl , ai,1 ∈ Zq randomly, compute X0 = ∏lk=1(xi,0,k) · ϑ(d0+b)·H(M) ·
ψd0+b · vd0 , X1 = gd0+b, X2 = gd0 ·∏lk=1(xi,1,k) = gd0+∑
l
k=1 ri,k , X3 = gai,1 · g
− 1ω
1 · gc, X4 =
yski,0 · yc according to the corresponding ski,0, X5,k = xi,1,k · gd0+t = gri,k+d0+t with k ∈
[1, 2......, l];
– Compute the vector−→η = (ηk) related to the satisfying assignment V = (v1, v2, ....., vl), where
ηk ∈ Zq with k ∈ [1, 2......, l];
– Compute Ik = gdk · (X1)
ηk
vk with k ∈ [1, 2......, l], Qj = yai,1 · yc · gc · X0 ·∏lk=1 ψ
(d0+t)·Λk,j ·
∏lk=1[(sk,j)
Λk,j · (uj)(d0+t)·Λk,j ·vk · (uj)dk ·Λk,j ·vk ] with j ∈ [1, 2....., .tmax];
– The algorithm finally generates and outputs a mesh signature
σm = {X1, X2, X3, X4, (X5,1, ......., X5,l) , (I1, ......., Il) , (Q1, ......., Qtmax )}.
Similarly, setting a′i,1 = ai,1 −
a
ω , σm is a valid mesh signature. If ai,1 −
a
ω = 0 mod q, the above
procedure cannot occur and aborts. Otherwise, a mesh signature σm is passed to A.
5. Guess: If B finally does not abort, then the adversary A can output its result x′ ∈ {0, 1} with
probability at least ε and succeeds if x′ = x. Then we may get the following:








, (I1∗, I2∗, ......., Il∗) ,
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Q1∗, Q2∗, ......., Q∗tmax
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= f a = ga·b,
which solves the given CDH problem.
Then we compute the probability that B does not abort. For the complete simulation procedure
of B, we must assure that all key queries can have ai,1 − aω 6= 0 mod q in related queries Phases 1
and 2, all atomic signature queries can have vk = H(msgk||pkk) 6= 0 mod q for all k ∈ [1, 2, ......, l] in
related Queries Phases 1 and 2, and all mesh signature queries can have ai,1 − aω 6= 0 mod q in related
Queries Phases 1 and 2. Therefore, if B will not abort, then we must assure that the following three
conditions hold:
(a) ai,1 − aω 6= 0 mod q in the related key queries of Queries Phases 1 and 2;
(b) vk = H(msgk||pkk) 6= 0 mod q for all k ∈ [1, 2, ......, l] in the related atomic signature queries of
Queries Phases 1 and 2;
(c) ai,1 − aω 6= 0 mod q in the related mesh signature queries of Queries Phases 1 and 2.




ω 6= 0 mod q, with j1=1, 2, ......, qk1 , qk1 denotes the queries number of “Generate-Key”
oracle in related Queries Phase 1;
Rj1 :vk = H(msgk||pkk) 6= 0 mod q for all k ∈ [1, 2, ......, l], with j1=1, 2, ......, qa1 , qa1 denotes the
queries number of “Atomic Signature” oracle in related Queries Phase 1;
Tj1 :ai,1−
a
ω 6= 0 mod q, with j1=1, 2, ......, qm1 , qm1 denotes the queries number of “Mesh Signature”
oracle in related Queries Phase 1;
Ej2 :ai,1 −
a
ω 6= 0 mod q, with j2=1, 2, ......, qk2 , qk2 denotes the queries number of “Generate-Key”
oracle in related Queries Phase 2;
Rj2 :vk = H(msgk||pkk) 6= 0 mod q for all k ∈ [1, 2, ......, l], with j2=1, 2, ......, qa2 , qa2 denotes the
queries number of “Atomic Signature” oracle in related Queries Phase 2;
Tj2 :ai,1−
a
ω 6= 0 mod q, with j2=1, 2, ......, qm2 , qm2 denotes the queries number of “Mesh Signature”
oracle in related Queries Phase 2.
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= (1− qk1q ) · (1−
qk2
q ) · [1− qa1 + qa1 · (1−
1
q )
l ] · [1− qa2 + qa2 · (1− 1q )l ] · (1−
qm1
q ) · (1−
qm2
q ).
Therefore, we can get that ε′ = (1− qk1q ) · (1−
qk2
q ) · [1− qa1 + qa1 · (1−
1
q )
l ] · [1− qa2 + qa2 · (1−
1
q )
l ] · (1− qm1q ) · (1−
qm2
q ) · (ε−
1
2 ).
If B is completely simulated, then A generates a valid mesh signature forgery with probability
at least ε, and B may be used to compute ga·b. The time cost of B mainly includes the time of
the exponentiations and multiplications in queries. We assume that the time of other lightweight
computations is ignored, then the time cost of B is
h̄′ = h̄ + O((qk1 + qk2) · [3 · Cexp + Cmul ] + (qa1 + qa2) · [(2 · l · tmax + 3) · Cexp + (l · tmax + 1) · Cmul ] +
(qm1 + qm2) · [(4 · l · tmax + 3 · l + 13) · Cexp + (4 · l · tmax + 4 · l + 8) · Cmul ]).
Thus, Theorem 2 follows.
Appendix A.3. Correctness
In the proposed scheme, the mesh signature is
Φ = {X1, X2, X3, X4, (X5,1, ......., X5,l) , (I1, ......., Il) , (Q1, ......., Qtmax )},
where
X0 = ∏lk=1(xi,0,k) · ϑ(d0+b)·H(M) · ψd0+b ·vd0
= ∏lk=1(g
ski,0
l ·vri,k ) · ϑ(d0+b)·H(M) · ψd0+b ·vd0
= gski,0 ·v∑lk=1 ri,k · ϑ(d0+b)·H(M) · ψd0+b ·vd0
= gai,0 · ϑ(d0+b)·H(M) · ψd0+b ·vd0+∑lk=1 ri,k ,
X1 = gd0+b,
X2 = gd0 ·∏lk=1(xi,1,k) = gd0+∑
l
k=1 ri,k ,
X3 = pki,1 · gc,
X4 = yai,0 · yc,
X5,k = xi,1,k · gd0+t = gri,k+d0+t,
Ik = gdk · (X1)
ηk
vk ,
Qj = ski,1 · yc · gc · X0 ·∏lk=1 ψ
(d0+t)·Λk,j ·∏lk=1[(sk,j)
Λk,j · (uj)(d0+t)·Λk,j ·vk · (uj)dk ·Λk,j ·vk ]




(d0+t)·Λk,j ·vk · (uj)dk ·Λk,j ·vk ]
= f a · yai,1+c · gc+ai,0 · ϑ(d0+b)·H(M) · ψd0+b · vd0+∑lk=1 ri,k · ∏lk=1 ψ
(d0+t)·Λk,j · ∏lk=1[(ψri,k ·
(uvk ·ri,kj ))
Λk,j · (uj)(d0+t)·Λk,j ·vk · (uj)dk ·Λk,j ·vk ]
= f a · yai,1+c · gc+ai,0 · ϑ(d0+b)·H(M) · ψd0+b · vd0+∑lk=1 ri,k · ∏lk=1 ψ
(d0+t)·Λk,j · ∏lk=1 ψ
ri,k ·Λk,j ·
∏lk=1(uj)
vk ·ri,k ·Λk,j ·∏lk=1(uj)
(d0+t)·Λk,j ·vk ·∏lk=1(uj)
dk ·Λk,j ·vk
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)
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